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Ab(ju)dication: How Procedure Defeats Civil Liberties in the
"War on Terror"
Susan N. Herman*
Terrorism poses many kinds of challenges. One of the most wrenching is
the question of how far we are willing to go in our quest for security. Will we
sacrifice our ideals? What should we accept as the moral, constitutional, and
international limitations on practices like detention, interrogation, and mass
surveillance?
An equally compelling question under our constitutional structure is who
will make these society-defining decisions. What should be the relative
involvement of Congress, the President, and the courts?
In a series of historic cases, the Supreme Court undertook providing a check
against antiterrorism detention policies designed by the executive branch to
avoid judicial oversight. Many of these cases involved non-U.S. citizens held
at the Guantinamo Bay detention camp.1 The petitioner in Hamdi v. Rumsfel&
was a U.S. citizen detained within the United States.3 In the course of the
decision, finding that Yaser Hamdi had a right to due process in connection
with his detention, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor observed:
In so holding, we necessarily reject the Government's assertion that separation
of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in
such circumstances. . . . Whatever power the United States Constitution
envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy
organizations in times of conflict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three
branches when individual liberties are at stake.4
Even a state of war, O'Connor said, would not be a "blank check for the
President when it comes to the rights of the Nation's citizens." 5
While the cases involving Guantinamo detainees did not declare that those
detainees enjoyed all the constitutional rights of U.S. citizens, the Court did
* Centennial Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School; President, American Civil Liberties Union. B.A.
Barnard College, 1968; J.D. New York University, 1974. I would like to thank Rebecca Richman and Megan
Bumb for their research assistance, and the Suffolk University Law Review for the invitation to deliver the 2016
Donahue Lecture. This article is an adaptation of that speech.
1. See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 550 U.S. 1301 (2007); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557
(2006); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
2. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
3. Id. at 510.
4. Id. at 535-36.
5. Id at 536.
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allow the detainees to bring habeas corpus claims in federal court to address
issues about their detention.6
By way of contrast, in the many other areas where the "war on terror" has
generated deprivations of life, liberty, and privacy, the Supreme Court and
lower federal courts have utterly failed to provide a much needed check on
governmental excesses, including practices like extraordinary rendition, the
use of "enhanced interrogation techniques,"8 targeted killings,9 and dragnet
surveillance policies.10 This stonewalling has prevailed even when U.S.
citizens have been involved. The courts have hidden behind procedure on a
number of grounds, including standing,' technical pleading rules, 12 the state
secrets privilege,' 3 and limitations on the Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents
of the Federal Bureau of Narcoticsl4 cause of action, in refusing to hear the
merits of challenges based on the Constitution, federal statutes, and
international law.
These opinions are an embarrassment to the legal profession. Incalculable
judicial resources are invested in providing elaborate, often arcane,
explanations for why the court in question should not consider the merits of
each case. Some courts offer multiple procedural defenses in multi-section
opinions; others dispose of a case on one procedural ground while noting that
other possible excuses remain in reserve. These excruciating exercises in
procedure follow excruciating recitations of the plaintiffs allegations: terrible
accounts of the U.S. government's involvement in kidnapping, torture,
unconstitutional surveillance, targeted killings beyond any battlefield, and other
secret operations.
The bottom line in case after case is that the courts have managed to absent
themselves from even considering whether many highly questionable
6. See generally Boumediene, 550 U.S.; Hamdan, 548 U.S.; Rasul, 542 U.S. The involvement of the
courts in overseeing detention of non-Americans turned out to be limited. See Aziz Z. Huq, What Good Is
Habeas?, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 385, 389-90 (2010) (examining "marginal" effects of Boumediene v. Bush's
declaration of habeas jurisdiction for noncitizen Guantinamo detainees); Gerald L. Neuman, The Habeas
Corpus Suspension Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 537 (2010) (discussing judicial
remedies for wrongfully detained individuals).
7. See infra Part I.A.
8. See id
9. See infra Part I.B.
10. See infra Part I.C.
11. See generally Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013); Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d
1 (D.D.C. 2010); infra Parts I.B-I.C.
12. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 663-65 (2009); infra Part II.B.1.
13. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1077 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (expounding
state secrets doctrine), cert. denied, 563 U.S. 1002 (2011); El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 302 (4th
Cir. 2007) (holding district court correctly applied state secrets privilege), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007);
infra Part I.A.
14. 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
15. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 571-77 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978
(2010); infra Parts I.A.2, I.A.4, & I.B.
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governmental policies and practices are illegal or unconstitutional. It is
remarkable, for example, that although quite a few men have gone to U.S.
courts with substantiated claims that they were subjected to extraordinary
rendition and torture involving American officials, not a single one of these
plaintiffs has received a hearing on the merits of his claim. The courts assume
the truth of allegations of barbaric treatment for purposes of the opinion, and
then close the procedural closet door on those allegations. Courts of appeals
have been consistent in adopting this deflective posture even when American
citizens have been involved. 16
Taken individually, discussion of each of the doctrines in question may look
like legal business as usual: causes of action are limited, officials may be
immune from lawsuits, and pleading must be done according to rules. But
when these doctrines are placed side by side, they form a virtually impenetrable
barrier before the courthouse door. In some cases, the majority opinion authors
have to work hard to stretch a preclusive doctrine to fit. These procrustean
opinions are often vulnerable to criticism for interpreting a procedural doctrine
too expansively in the particular case, in a category of cases, or in general.'
Not infrequently, dissenting judges, looking at the same precedents and
arguments, are able to point to available paths around and through the
procedural thicket. Choosing a broader interpretation of the state secrets
privilege or the standing doctrine when a narrower view is available is a choice
to circumscribe the role of the courts.
The combined effect of these procedural obstacles is to undermine our
constitutional system of checks and balances. It is not just one plaintiff who is
barred from litigating due to a declared lack of standing or an award of
qualified immunity to a particular defendant. No one else can get past the
procedural Maginot Line either, as the judges often recognize. The majority
opinions in the cases discussed in this Article address each preclusive doctrine
in turn and sometimes, at the end of the opinion, express regret that the
combined effect of all of their doctrinal interpretation is to let injustice stand.
And then these judges will rationalize their conclusions by announcing that the
role of the courts in these areas should be limited. Tell the elected branches,
they say, rather than the courts. Our hands are tied.
Congress and two post-9/11 Presidents, however, have shown little interest
in providing any form of accountability or redress for victims of torture or
targeted drones. Justice O'Connor was right in concluding that the politically
16. See Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 421-23, 427-29 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (dismissing citizen's
complaint alleging torture with Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) involvement), reh'g en banc denied, No.
14-5194, 2016 BL 29006 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2016), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. May 31,
2016) (No. 15-1461); Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 394-97 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (dismissing citizen's complaint
alleging torture with American military involvement).
17. See Richard H. Fallon Jr., The Fragmentation of Standing, 93 TEX. L. REv. 1061, 1062-63 (2015);
infra Parts I.A-C.
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insulated courts are indispensable in these important national debates. No
judicial review in this area generally means no meaningful review at all.
I. AB(JU)DICATION IN THE LOWER COURTS
A. Extraordinary Rendition and Torture
The term "extraordinary rendition" refers to clandestine abduction and
detention outside the United States of people suspected of involvement in
terrorism, who are then interrogated using methods impermissible under U.S.
and international laws. Since the release of the Senate Intelligence
Committee's 2014 report on the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) detention
and interrogation program, it is implausible to contend that American officials
were not connected with torture.! 8 The report found 119 instances of American
involvement in extraordinary rendition and torture.19 Committee Chairwoman
Dianne Feinstein's report reached four major conclusions:
(1) The CIA's "enhanced interrogation techniques" were not effective. (2) The
CIA provided extensive inaccurate information about the operation of the
program and its effectiveness to policymakers and the public. (3) The CIA's
management of the program was inadequate and deeply flawed. (4) The CIA
program was far more brutal than the CIA represented to policymakers and the
American public.20
But even after the release of this report, none of the 119 victims of these
practices, to my knowledge, has received any form of redress or apology.
President Obama, who, at the very beginning of his first term, issued an
Executive Order renouncing torture prospectively, also announced that he was
turning the page and not looking back at what had happened before he took
office.2 1 There were no investigations, no independent counsel appointments,
22
no congressional hearings, and no apologies.
The victims who tried seeking redress in the courts all alleged that American
agents-either with the CIA, FBI, or the military-improperly solicited,
condoned, or participated in detention and interrogation methods they would
18. See S. REP. No. 113-288 (2014).
19. See id. at 16 (detailing findings and conclusions of study of CIA detention and interrogation program).
20. See id. at 3-4, 8-13.
21. See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4,893 (Jan. 22, 2009) (announcing Obama Administration's
position on past torture); see also Jens David Ohlin, The Torture Lawyers, 51 HARV. INT'L L.J. 193, 193-95
(2010) (describing decisions not to prosecute government agents of Bush Administration who tortured
detainees).
22. House of Representatives subcommittees held a hearing at which Maher Arar spoke via
videoconference. See Rendition to Torture: The Case of Maher Arar: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l
Orgs., Human Rights, & Oversight of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, & the Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil
Rights, and Civil Liberties on the Judiciary, I10th Cong. 29-41 (2007), https://fas.org/irp/congress/
2007_hr/arar.pdf [https://perma.cc/2YXR-2JRU] (documenting statement of Maher Arar). Neither the full
House nor the Senate followed up on Arar's case.
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have been legally prohibited from using themselves. They argued that, at the
least, the agents in these cases had substantial reasons for believing that a
person being rendered to or questioned in another country was in danger of
being subjected to torture. As in the Guantinamo cases, conduct outside the
United States-and here involving foreign interrogators-provided an end run
around accountability or liability under American law. Although the
procedural excuses vary, the results in all of these attempts at litigation have
been the same: case dismissed.
1. The Fourth Circuit-El-Masri and the State Secrets Privilege
On December 31, 2003, Macedonian authorities removed Khaled El-Masri,
a German citizen of Lebanese descent, from a bus in Macedonia where he was
on vacation, and detained him for twenty-three days.23 From there, El-Masri
alleges that CIA operatives flew him to a squalid CIA-run detention facility
near Kabul, Afghanistan, where he was incarcerated incommunicado, bound,
24beaten, and harshly interrogated. After four months, he was flown to a
remote area of Albania and released.25
There was enough evidence substantiating El-Masri's description of his
nightmarish ordeal, including CIA involvement, that a draft report issued by the
Council of Europe in June 2006 concluded that his account was substantially
accurate.26 There is also evidence that CIA officials knew at least as early as
April that the detention of El-Masri was a mistake. The actual suspect wanted
27
for questioning was another man with a similar name.
Although El-Masri's lawsuit named CIA Director George Tenet as the
defendant, the United States intervened as a defendant and demanded that the
28
court dismiss the lawsuit on the basis of the state secrets privilege. This
privilege posits that the government must have the ability to keep certain
activities secret, for the sake of national security, among other reasons. If state
secrets are involved, one Supreme Court precedent, United States v. Reynolds,29
instructs the court to conduct the litigation in a manner that will avoid exposure
of sensitive documents or pieces of evidence. 30 If the court concludes that it is
not possible to conduct the trial in a manner that will preserve the secrets in
question, a more extreme precedent, Totten v. United States,31 authorizes the
court to dismiss the case outright, even if that means that an individual who has
23. See EI-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 300 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007).
24. See id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 302.
27. See EI-Masri, 479 F.3d at 300.
28. See id. at 299-300.
29. 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
30. See id. at 10-11.
31. 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
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suffered grievous harm due to government misconduct will not be allowed to
32
bring a lawsuit seeking redress.
In a 2007 opinion, the Fourth Circuit dismissed El-Masri's claim that his
detention violated the Constitution and international norms on the ground that
litigating the claim might compromise state secrets. 3 3 Ironically, Reynolds, the
1953 source of the state secrets privilege doctrine, involved a government
cover-up rather than actual state secrets. 34  In that case, the Supreme Court
ordered dismissal of three widows' wrongful death actions after the
government had claimed that litigation about their husbands' deaths in an
airplane crash would risk revealing military secrets. But when the internal
Air Force report on the incident was finally made public in 1996, it turned out
that no military secrets had been involved. What was revealed was blatant
government negligence: pilot error, prior government knowledge that engines
of the type of plane involved tended to catch fire, a poor record of maintenance,
and inadequate safety procedures. 36
It is not my goal in this Article to analyze the proper scope of the state
secrets privilege (or other preclusive doctrines), or to suggest possible reform
of its scope. Others have done that.37 I will invite the reader to observe the
Fourth Circuit's choice to spend most of its opinion finding its way to a
dismissal rather than working harder to try to find a way for a trial to proceed in
a manner that might have protected any legitimate secrets.
After constructing its state secrets doctrine barrier to litigation, the court
concluded, "[w]e also reject El-Masri's view that we are obliged to jettison
procedural restrictions-including the law of privilege-that might impede our
ability to act as a check on the Executive." 38 The court did offer El-Masri an
apology of sorts for refusing to hear his claim, acknowledging that he "suffers
this reversal not through any fault of his own, but because his personal interest
in pursuing his civil claim is subordinated to the collective interest in national
32. See id at 106 (declaring plaintiff's "lips ... for ever sealed respecting" matter at issue).
33. See El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 308-12 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947
(2007).
34. See Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 3-5.
35. See id at 11-12.
36. See generally BARRY SIEGEL, CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE (2008) (describing report and case at length).
37. See Victor Hansen, Extraordinary Renditions and the State Secrets Privilege: Keeping Focus on the
Task at Hand, 33 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 629, 646 (2008) (criticizing result in El-Masri v. Untied
States); D. A. Jeremy Telman, Intolerable Abuses: Rendition for Torture and the State Secrets Privilege, 63
ALA. L. REV. 429, 454 (2012) (critiquing extension of Totten bar in extraordinary rendition cases); Benjamin
Bernstein, Comment, Over Before It Even Began: Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan and the Use of the State
Secrets Privilege in Extraordinary Rendition Cases, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1400, 1403-09 (2011) (critiquing
subsequent state secrets and extraordinary rendition case conflation of Reynolds privilege and Totten bar);
Michael Q. Cannon, Note, Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc.: The Ninth Circuit Sends the Totten Bar
Flying Away on the Jeppesen Airplane, 2012 BYU L. REV. 407, 409 (2012) (critiquing expansive application of
state secrets privilege in extraordinary rendition cases).
38. See El-Masri, 479 F.3d at 312.
84 [Vol. L:79
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security." 39
As in Reynolds, the government's shield in this case certainly covered up
misconduct. It is less clear whether this decision contributed anything more to
national security than the Reynolds decision did. The facts surrounding El-
Masri's case were widely known. There is no way for the public to tell what
secrets, if any, the government might have been protecting beyond the
embarrassment of its own conduct and its own mistake, or whether the
litigation might have been conducted in a manner that would have respected
those secrets appropriately. There was no dissent and no rehearing in the
Fourth Circuit. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.40
After this decision, El-Masri published an Op-Ed in the Los Angeles Times
entitled, I Am Not a State Secret.41 "It seems" he said, "that the only place in
the world where my case cannot be discussed is in a U.S. courtroom." 4 2 El-
Masri has not received an apology.
2. The Second Circuit - Arar and Bivens Special Factors
Maher Arar, a dual citizen of Canada and Syria, was apprehended at the
John F. Kennedy International Airport in September 2002 while he was waiting
for a connecting flight home to Montreal after a vacation in Tunisia.43  The
FBI, having received what turned out to be erroneous information from
Canadian authorities, apprehended and questioned him.44 American
immigration authorities concluded, from the misleading information, that Arar
was a member of al Qaeda.45 He was removed to Jordan and then to Syria
46despite his request to return to Canada or Switzerland. In Syria, he was
detained for ten months in an underground cell measuring six feet by three feet
by seven feet high, and interrogated and allegedly tortured, under the direction
of U.S. officials.47
39. El-Masri v. United States, 479 F.3d 296, 313 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 947 (2007).
40. El-Masri v. United States, 552 U.S. 947 (2007) (mem.).
41. Khaled El-Masri, I Am Not a State Secret, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 3, 2007), http://www.latimes.com/
news/la-oe-elmasri3marO3-story.html [https://perma.cc/FAZ7-7SWN].
42. Id.
The U.S. government does not deny that I was wrongfully kidnapped.... Above all, what I want
from the lawsuit is a public acknowledgment from the U.S. government that I was innocent, a
mistaken victim of its rendition program, and an apology for what I was forced to endure. Without
this vindication, it has been impossible for me to return to a normal life.
Id.
43. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 565 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (discussing circumstances of case),
cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010).
44. See id at 565-66.
45. See id at 566.
46. See id at 565-66.
47. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 566.
2017] 85
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Arar raised claims under the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) and also
under the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause (regarding his treatment while
in the United States).48 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, sitting en banc,
interpreted the TVPA as not covering Arar's claim.49 The court went on to
hold that Arar could not raise constitutional claims against the federal officials
involved under the Bivens doctrine, which creates a cause of action for people
to sue federal officials for violating their constitutional rights,50 because
"special factors" weighed against offering Arar a judicial forum.51 The Court's
exposition of this prudential doctrine amounts to an elaborate show of
deference to executive officials, and then to Congress, which is left to decide
whether to specially invite the courts to play a role in evaluating the
constitutionality of executive branch policies.52 In light of this resolution, the
court noted that it had no need to reach the defendants' back-up claims of
qualified immunity or the state secrets privilege.53
The en banc court was divided seven to four on the Bivens issue. 54  The
dissenters thought the majority could have chosen to afford a Bivens remedy to
Arar and then allow Congress to decide whether to legislate to close that door,
rather than closing the door and then leaving Congress to decide whether to
open it-a classic burden of proof decision. 5 The dissent also charged that the
majority was artificially dissecting Arar's claims to reach dismissal and double-
counting "special factors" regarding secrecy and security, interests already
protected by the state secrets privilege.56  On the whole, the dissenters said,
"[w]e fear that the majority is so bound and determined to declare categorically
that there is no Bivens action in the present 'context,' that it unnecessarily
makes dubious law."5s The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Arar's quest for accountability fared better in Canada, where a high-level
Commission of Inquiry was appointed. In 2004, after exhaustively
investigating the circumstances surrounding the case, the Commission
published its report, comprising 1,195 pages over three volumes. 59  The
48. See id. at 567-69.
49. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 568 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010).
50. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971).
51. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 573-81.
52. See id at 581.
53. See id at 563.
54. See id. at 596-605 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559, 582-83 (2d Cir. 2009) (en bane) (Sack, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part), cert. denied, 560 U.S. 978 (2010); Anya Bernstein, Congressional Will and the Role of the
Executive in Bivens Actions: What Is Special About Special Factors?, 45 IND. L. REv. 719, 764 (2012)
(arguing Bivens remedy should be implied in absence of contrary congressional preference).
56. See Arar, 585 F.3d at 583, 605-10 (Sack, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
57. See id. at 583.
58. See Arar v. Ashcroft, 560 U.S. 978 (2010) (mem.).
59. See COMM'N OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN RELATION TO MAHER ARAR,
REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 311-69 (2006),
86 [Vol. L:79
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Commission concluded that serious mistakes had been made in the handling of
Arar, analyzed how those mistakes had occurred, and made recommendations
for reforms designed to prevent any such errors in the future. 60 As a result of
this painstaking study, the Canadian government apologized to Arar, awarded
him damages, and agreed to reform its systems as recommended by the
Commission.61 The United States has not followed suit and has never
apologized to Arar for his treatment.62
3. The Ninth Circuit-Mohamed, State Secrets, and the Obama Administration
I will spare readers' sensitivities by not recounting the facts alleged by
Ethiopian extraordinary rendition victim Binyam Mohamed and his fellow
plaintiffs. The opinion recounts Mohamed's description of the torture he
endured, which is even more gruesome than what El-Masri and Arar suffered.63
Given the appellate courts' closed ranks in rejecting extraordinary rendition
claims against government officials, Mohamed's attorneys decided to sue a
private contractor, Jeppesen Dataplan, jocularly known as the "CIA's Travel
Agent" because of its involvement in transporting torture victims.64 But the
United States intervened and asked the court to dismiss the complaint under the
state secrets privilege. The district court complied, a panel of the Ninth
Circuit reversed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted a
rehearing en banc. 66
Notably, government lawyers continued to rely on the state secrets privilege
on appeal even after the administration changed hands following the election of
Barack Obama.f The en banc Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit split six
to five on the question of whether the state secrets privilege should preclude all
litigation of these claims, with the dissenting judges emphasizing the fact that a
large amount of the evidence proffered in the case was already publicly
68 69
available.68 The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
http://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/295791/publication.html [https://perma.cc/3LE7-UL48].
60. See id
61. See Prime Minister Releases Letter of Apology to Maher Arar, VIVE LE CANADA (Jan. 27, 2007),
http://www.vivelecanada.ca/article/192154985-prime-minister-releases-letter-of-apology-to-maher-arar
[https://perma.cc/2P2T-3ZSQ].
62. The Unfinished Case ofMaher Arar, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/ 2009/02
/18/opinion/18wed2.html?_r-0.
63. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070, 1073-75 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc)
(describing Mohamed's allegations concerning his extraordinary rendition and torture), cert. denied, 563 U.S.
1002 (2011).
64. See Jane Mayer, CIA 's Travel Agent, NEW YORKER (Oct. 30, 2006), http://www.newyorker.com
/magazine/2006/10/30/the-c-i-a-s-travel-agent [https://perma.cc/GXZ8-R8SJ].
65. See Mohamed, 614 F.3d at 1076.
66. See id. at 1073.
67. See id. at 1077.
68. See id at 1089. A considerable amount of this evidence is listed in an appendix to the opinion. See
id. at 1102-31.
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After declining to hear the case, the majority helpfully offered the plaintiffs
some ideas for seeking remedies elsewhere. The executive branch, the court
noted, was not prevented from "honoring the fundamental principles of
justice." 70  In addition, the court observed, Congress-"where the
government's power to remedy wrongs is ultimately reposed"-has the power
to investigate alleged excesses, enact private bills, or enact remedial legislation
authorizing courts to hear cases like this one.71 None of that has happened.
4. The D.C. Circuit - Meshal (a U.S. Citizen) and Bivens
Amir Meshal's account of extraordinary rendition, detention, and
interrogation differs from the three experiences above in several respects. First,
Meshal was not actually tortured, although he was detained in deplorable
conditions and threatened with torture and death.72 Second, Meshal is an
American citizen. Like the non-citizens El-Masri and Arar, Meshal was
released without being charged with any offense.73 Third, the American
officials allegedly involved in mistreating Meshal overseas in Kenya were not
CIA agents, but employees of the FBI, the very agency whose employees the
Court allowed to be sued in Bivens.74
Nevertheless, the D.C. Circuit held that unless Congress affirmatively
decides to legislate and create a new cause of action affording someone in
Meshal's position a judicial hearing, his claim is barred. 5 Analysis of "special
factors" again led to the conclusion that a cause of action should not be
available under Bivens.76  Further, the circuit court reached this conclusion
even though there was less cause to be concerned about the government's
foreign affairs interests, where domestic criminal law enforcement was
involved rather than intelligence or military agents.77 One member of the panel
dissented.78
69. See Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 U.S. 1002 (2011) (mem.).
70. Id. at 1091.
71. Id. at 1091-92 (citation omitted). Mohamed was subsequently sent to Guantinamo where he spent
nearly five years. See id. at 1074.
72. See Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 2015), reh'g en banc denied, No. 14-
5194, 2016 BL 29006 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2016), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S. May 31, 2016)
(No. 15-1461).
73. See id at 419-20.
74. See id. at 419.
75. See id at 426-27.
76. See Meshal, 804 F.3d at 426-27.
77. See Patrick Gregory, No Relief for Allegedly Tortured U.S. Citizen, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 27,
2015), http://www.bna.com/no-relief-allegedly-n57982062793/ [https://perma.cc/3FAE-V526] (discussing case
and quoting critiques of opinion's breadth).
78. See Meshal v. Higgenbotham, 804 F.3d 417, 431 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Pillard, J., dissenting) (noting,
inter alia, viability of Meshal's claim under Bivens if experience occurred within United States), reh'g en banc
denied, No. 14-5194, 2016 BL 29006 (D.C. Cir. Feb. 2, 2016), petition for cert. filed, 84 U.S.L.W. 3675 (U.S.
May 31, 2016) (No. 15-1461).
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In earlier cases, the D.C. Circuit held that Bivens claims were unavailable to
both non-citizens 79 and citizens80 who wanted to bring lawsuits about the
constitutionality or legality of their abusive treatment while in military
detention in Afghanistan or Iraq. The opinions in cases alleging misconduct by
the military read somewhat differently from those involving the CIA because
the court can find additional "special factors" counseling against judicial
review, arising out of the military context.81
A divided Seventh Circuit agreed that all such cases against military
personnel should be dismissed, as did the Fourth Circuit; the Supreme Court
denied certiorari in both cases.82 While some district court judges and
individual appellate judges have disagreed, arguing that the courts do have a
role to play in these cases, circuits have closed ranks, and the Supreme Court
has closed its doors.
The lesson from these cases is that government officials can engage in
kidnapping and torture, at least abroad, and if their victims sue, those officials
can simply hide behind allegations of national security and foreign affairs
interests. The courthouse doors will not look behind their shield.
5. Salim v. Mitchell and the Psychologists
The American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is currently representing three
of the men named in the Senate torture report as victims of the CIA program of
"enhanced interrogation techniques." These techniques included prolonged
sleep deprivation, nudity, starvation, beating, water dousing, and extreme forms
of sensory deprivation routinely administered with the intention of breaking a
detainee's will. Two of these men, a Somalian citizen, Suleiman Abdullah
Salim, and a Libyan citizen, Mohamed Ahmed Ben Soud, tell shocking tales of
abduction, rendition, and torture.83 In 2005, Ben Soud was rendered back to
Libya, from which he had fled in 1991 because he feared persecution over his
involvement with a group opposing Muammar Gaddafi's dictatorship. He was
79. See Ali v. Rumsfeld, 649 F.3d 762, 764-65 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (dismissing claims by Afghani and Iraqi
citizens). These citizens alleged abusive treatment in military detention facilities including the infamous Abu
Ghraib. See id.
80. See Doe v. Rumsfeld, 683 F.3d 390, 391-92 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (dismissing U.S. citizen's lawsuit
against military for illegal and abusive detention).
81. See Katrina Carmichael, Note, The Unconstitutional Torture of an American by the U.S. Military: Is
There a Remedy Under Bivens?, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REv. 1093, 1126-27 (2013) (arguing judicial obligation exists
to hear such claims).
82. See Vance v. Rumsfeld, 701 F.3d 193, 195 (7th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (dismissing torture claims on
basis of Bivens and revised pleading rules of Iqbal), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 2796 (2013) (mem.); Lebron v.
Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540, 544 (4th Cir. 2012) (dismissing illegal and abusive detention claims on basis of
Bivens), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 2751 (2012) (mem.).
83. See James Risen, After Torture, Ex-Detainee Is Still a Captive of 'the Darkness,'N.Y. TIMEs (Oct. 12,
2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/12/world/cia-torture-abuses-detainee.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=
Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=photo-spot-region&region=top-news&WT.nav-top-
news&_r-0 (recounting lasting impact of treatment on Salim).
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imprisoned in Libya for five years and released only after Gaddafi was
overthrown. The third man, Gul Rahman, cannot tell his own story because he
died in a prison cell in Afghanistan while being subjected to "enhanced
interrogation techniques." 84 The most likely cause of death seems to have been
hypothermia.85
Instead of naming government officials as defendants, likely a futile gesture
in light of the cases described above, the lawsuit targets James Elmer Mitchell
and John "Bruce" Jessen, the psychologists who designed and sold the "learned
helplessness" detention and interrogation program to the CIA. 86  Only the
United States government can claim the state secrets privilege so that defense is
not available to the psychologists. The plaintiffs' lawyers specifically asked
U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch not to interpose a state secrets privilege
claim so that a court could finally evaluate the legality of Mitchell and Jessen's
protocol.87 The government has not, as of this writing, raised a state secrets
claim.
Nevertheless, these defendants seek to hide behind other procedural bars.
Their motion to dismiss raises the stark argument that whatever torture has
occurred should not be the subject of any lawsuits because of the political
question doctrine. Avoiding the twists and turns of the narrower procedural
doctrines previously discussed, the political question argument frankly asserts,
with no mask, that the courts have no business second guessing decisions made
by the elected branches, even when those decisions involve the torture of
innocent people. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and agreed to
allow the parties to depose former CIA officials, John Rizzo and Jose
Rodriguez. 89 The Ninth Circuit and the Supreme Court thus have another
chance to decide whether or not the courts will play any role at all in
maintaining our avowed principles opposing torture.
84. See id.
85. See Complaint & Demand for Jury Trial at 3, 72, Salim v. Mitchell, No. CV-15-0286-JLQ, 2016 WL
1717185 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2016) (No. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ).
86. See Salim v. Mitchell, No. CV-15-0286-JLQ, 2016 WL 1717185, at *3 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2016);
S. REP. No. 113-228, at 11 (2014) (reporting neither psychologist previously familiar with counterterrorism or
interrogation techniques).
87. See Letter from Steven R. Shapiro, Legal Dir., Am. Civil Liberties Union, to Loretta Lynch, Att'y
Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice (Nov. 5, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/fielddocument/aclu letter_
to lynchonciatorture lawsuit.pdf[https://perma.cc/6Q56-TA4B].
88. See Defendants' Motion to Dismiss at 3-10, Salim v. Mitchell, No. CV-15-0286-JLQ, 2016 WL
1717185 (E.D. Wash. Apr. 28, 2016) (No. 2:15-CV-286-JLQ) (arguing lawsuit meets all requirements for
political question defense). The defendants also claimed the case should be dismissed on the basis of derivative
sovereign immunity. Id. at 6.
89. See Salim, No. 2016 WL 1717185, at *1; see also Steven M. Watt, Historic Ruling Puts Justice
Within Reach for CIA Torture Victims, ACLU (Apr. 29, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/historic-
ruling-puts-justice-within-reach-cia-torture-victims [https://perma.cc/B8QU-GAZQ].
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B. Targeted Killings
There is no way to tell how many people have been killed by targeted drone
strikes outside of traditional battlefields. However, the numbers are significant.
Both the Bush and Obama Administrations were reluctant to release any
information about this program at all. A number of Freedom of Information
Act lawsuits sought to uncover more about the process of deciding who should
be a target and the extent of collateral damage.90  President Obama only
recently admitted that such a program even exists, and now has offered some
swan song transparency providing details about the program, including
estimates of the number of innocent people killed.91 According to the Director
of National Intelligence's (DNI) long-overdue summary, there have only been
473 strikes outside of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria-areas of "active
92hostility"--between January 20, 2009 and December 15, 2015. And during
that time, the DNI reports that only 64-116 "non-combatants"-defined as
"individuals who may not be made the object of attack under applicable
international law"-have been killed.93
The estimates in the Obama Administration's report, however, are
dramatically different from the estimates of independent observers. The
Bureau of Investigative Journalism, 94 for example, estimates that since 2004, at
90. See Complaint at 1, ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 1:15-cv-01954-UA (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 16,
2016), https://www.aclu.org/legal-document/aclu-v-doj-records-casualties-targeted-killing-program-foia-comp
laint [https://perma.cc/2B2V-C8MF] [hereinafter Complaint No. 1:15-cv-01954-UA] (seeking release of
records regarding target-killing program); Complaint at 1, ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, No. 12-CV-0794
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 1, 2012), https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/tk-foia-complaint.pdf [https://perma.cc/GSL3-UY
8V] (seeking release of records regarding targeted killings of American citizens); Amended Complaint for
Injunctive Relief at 2, ACLU v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 808 F.Supp. 2d 280 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 1:10-cv-0436-
RMC) (seeking release of records containing all information on drone use since 2001). Among other
documents, the ACLU has sought the release of records regarding the legal basis for targeted killings, the
standards used to evaluate the decision to use lethal force, measures of civilian and bystander casualties, and
data (e.g., numbers, affiliation, identity) of those killed by the targeted killing program. See Complaint No.
1:15-cv-01 954-UA, supra.
91. See Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Remarks by the President at the Nat'l Def. Univ. (May
23, 2013), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/05/23/remarks-president-national-defense-unive
rsity [https://perma.cc/SN49-Q9RU] (discussing use of drones and transparency); Stephen Collinson, Obama
Confronts 'Cruel'Reality ofHis Drone War, CNN (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.cnn.com /2015/04/23/politics/
obama-drone-warren-weinstein-hostages/ [https://perma.cc/8ZHE-E4RM] (highlighting Obama's increased
drone use); see also Brett Max Kaufman, President Obama 's New, Long-Promised Drone 'Transparency' Is
Not Nearly Enough, ACLU (July 1, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/blog/speak-freely/president-obamas-new-
long-promised-drone-transparency-not-nearly-enough [https://perma.cc/ZB5S-EL59].
92. See Summary of Information Regarding US. Counterterrorism Strikes Outside Areas of Active
Hostilities, DIRECTOR NAT'L INTELLIGENCE 1, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroomi/Press%
20Releases/DNIReleaseCTStrikesOutsideAreasofActiveHostilities.PDF (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://
perma.cc/6WW6-N7LL] [hereinafter Summary of U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes].
93. See id.
94. See Covert Drone War, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.thebureauinvestigates.
com/category/projects/drones/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/L6YP-JMWA] (compiling data
about drone strikes).
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least 2,499 people in Pakistan alone have been killed by CIA drone strikes,
including hundreds of adult civilians (424-966) and children (172-207).95 The
DNI report "acknowledges" its figures differ from non-governmental
organizations, suggesting that a possible reason for this discrepancy is the U.S.
government's "sensitive intelligence" about the "combatant" status of many
individuals whom non-governmental organizations deem "non-combatants." 96
The government defines a "combatant" as any "individual who is part of a
belligerent party to an armed conflict, an individual who is taking a direct part
in hostilities, or an individual who is targetable in the exercise of U.S. national
self-defense." 9 7 It is the Obama Administration's application of this definition
and process for deciding who is a "combatant" that are controversial.
Like the unilateral executive decisions about detention that the Court
disapproved in Hamdi and the Guantinamo cases, decisions about whom to
target and when to strike are made wholly within the executive branch and out
of the public view. Congress has neither debated whether to authorize such
strikes nor exercised meaningful oversight. President Obama maintains that
there is no reason to be concerned about the level of discretion being exercised
unilaterally and in secret because he has promised to be careful and evidently
hopes that his protocols will have enough inertia to bind or at least influence his
98
successor.
One plaintiff has attempted to litigate the legality and constitutionality of
this program. When the news media reported that an American citizen living in
Yemen, Anwar Al-Aulaqi, had been put on the kill list, Anwar's father, Nasser
Al-Aulaqi, brought a lawsuit naming President Barack Obama as a defendant
and seeking to enjoin the killing of his son.99 Arguments that the targeted
killing program violates provisions of the Constitution including the Due
Process Clause, other American law, and international law were met with a
barrage of procedural objections: standing, the political question doctrine, the
Court's exercise of its "equitable discretion," the absence of a cause of action
under the Alien Tort Statute, and the state secrets privilege.100
The district court, in an eighty-three-page opinion, did not need to get
beyond the first offering, and held that Nasser Al-Aulaqi did not have standing
to bring the lawsuit.' 0 t The judge was disturbed by Al-Aulaqi's anti-American
advocacy, but also by the government's conduct and the breadth of the
95. See Get the Data: Drone Wars, BUREAU INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, https://www.thebureau
investigates.com/category/projects/drones/drones-graphs/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2016) [https://perma.cc/D8SK-
MRXE].
96. See Summary of U.S. Counterterrorism Strikes, supra note 92, at 2-3.
97. See id. at I n.a.
98. These decisions could be viewed as within the President's discretion as Commander-in-Chief to
decide how to conduct a war, if one accepts the idea that we are at war everywhere in the world.
99. See Al-Aulaqi v. Obama, 727 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 2010).
100. See id.
101. See id at 22-23 (concluding plaintiff did not meet requirements of third party or next friend standing).
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government's anti-judicial review arguments: "How is it that judicial approval
is required when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for
electronic surveillance, but that, according to defendants, judicial scrutiny is
prohibited when the United States decides to target a U.S. citizen overseas for
death?"'0 2
But procedure won the day. The judge held that Anwar Al-Aulaqi, could
make legal or constitutional arguments only on his own behalf, and only if he
submitted himself to the jurisdiction of an American court. 103 The complaint
was dismissed in 2010. Nasser Al-Aulaqi did not appeal this decision.
Subsequently, his son and another American, Samir Khan, were killed by a
drone on September 30, 2011.104 Anwar Al-Aulaqi's sixteen-year-old son,
Abdulrahman, not knowing his father had died, went to look for him and was
also killed by a drone in Yemen two weeks later.105 Nasser Al-Aulaqi brought
another lawsuit, this time against the Secretary of Defense, as the father of an
intended victim and the grandfather of an unintended victim who was also an
American citizen.106
A different district judge declined to reject the case on the broad ground that
it posed a political question, but did grant the government's motion to dismiss
on the ground that "special factors" counseled against implying a Bivens
remedy.10 7  In light of D.C. Circuit precedent on the Bivens doctrine from
rendition and torture cases, the court found it unnecessary to reach the backup
defense of qualified immunity.
C. Surveillance
The standing doctrine also defeated numerous attempts to challenge the
legality and constitutionality of controversial surveillance programs, including
the unauthorized National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance programs
revealed by a 2005 New York Times story. 08  The Sixth Circuit ruled that
plaintiffs cannot establish sufficient injury to challenge a covert surveillance
program unless they can show that they personally were subjected to covert
surveillance.109 The district court judge in the Michigan case found that the
plaintiffs alleged sufficient injury to establish standing: several plaintiffs were
102. See id at 8.
103. See Al-Aulaqi, 727 F. Supp. 2d at 17-20 (discussing Anwar Al-Aulaqi's potential standing in U.S.
courts).
104. See Mark Mazzetti et al., Two-Year Manhunt Led to Killing ofAwlaki in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Sept.
30, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/201 1/10/01/world/middleeast/anwar-al-awlaki-is-killed-in-yemen.html ?
pagewanted =all.
105. See Al-Aulaqi v. Panetta, 35 F. Supp. 3d 56, 60 (D.D.C. 2014).
106. See generally id
107. See id. at 74-80.
108. See James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y. TIMEs (Dec.
16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callers-without-courts.html?r-0.
109. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 493 F.3d 644, 687 (6th Cir. 2007).
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criminal defense attorneys who could not interview potential defense witnesses
over the telephone because they feared surveillance; others were authors and
scholars whose wary sources in the Middle East had dried up.110 That district
judge also dismissed the plaintiffs' allegations about the legality and
constitutionality of a data-mining program on the basis of the state secrets
privilege.
In 2011, a panel of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals finally broke ranks
by ruling in Amnesty International v. Clapper 12 that plaintiffs who could show
injuries like those described above could establish standing to challenge the
legality and constitutionality of another expansive surveillance program, even
without proof that they themselves had actually been under surveillance.113 A
motion for rehearing en banc was denied, with half the judges on the court
vigorously dissenting.1 4 The Supreme Court rushed into the breach, granted
certiorari, and guaranteed dismissal by reversing the panel's ruling on
standing.1 1 5
There is a sequel here too. After Edward Snowden's revelations about the
magnitude of post-9/11 surveillance, the ACLU brought another lawsuit
challenging the NSA's bulk collection of metadata. Because the ACLU itself
was a client of Verizon Wireless, one of the companies required to turn over
customer metadata, standing was not an issue. Finally freed from procedural
chains, the Second Circuit ruled that the metadata program was illegal.16
Subsequently, Congress modified the underlying authority that had contributed
to the ruling." 7
II. SUPREME COURT GATEKEEPING
A. "Cert. denied"
The Supreme Court has a unique procedural move available to avoid issues
it does not wish to decide: denying certiorari. In simply declining to hear a
case, the Court does not need to offer a reason. While the Court did want to
hear some issues about the detention of "enemy combatants" at Guantinamo
and beyond, the Justices' willingness to consider whether the political branches
110. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 767 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd on other
grounds, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir. 2007).
111. See id. at 766 (elaborating reasoning for dismissal).
112. 638F.3d118(2dCir.2011),rev'd, 133S.Ct. 1138(2013).
113. See id. at 149-50 (declaring surveillance cases not subject to stricter law of standing than in other
cases).
114. See Amnesty Int'l v. Clapper, 667 F.3d 163, 164 (2d Cir. 2011) (denying review en banc); see also id
at 172-73 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (objecting to denial of en banc review).
115. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int'l, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1143 (2013).
116. See ACLU v. Clapper, 785 F.3d 787, 792 (2d Cir. 2015) (holding metadata program exceeded scope
of congressional authorization).
117. See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, H.R. 2048, 114th Cong. (2015).
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have trampled on constitutional rights in their antiterrorism efforts has not
extended to the other areas discussed above. These include extraordinary
rendition and the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques," governmental
secrecy, and dragnet surveillance policies.
1. Extraordinary Rendition
The Court has denied certiorari in each case where extraordinary rendition
plaintiffs have asked the Court to review lower court decisions sloughing off
their claims as described above: German citizen Khaled El-Masri, 18 Canadian
citizen Maher Arar," 9 and Ethiopian Binyam Mohamed and his co-plaintiffs. 120
2. Pretextual Detentions
When the Second Circuit ruled that the government could use the federal
material witness statute to arrest and detain people who might have information
relevant to terrorism investigations even where no trial was pending, the Court
denied the certiorari petition of a man detained under this novel policy.121
3. Secrecy
The Court has routinely denied certiorari in antiterrorism-related cases
involving governmental secrecy and lack of transparency.
a. The Mosaic Theory
The D.C. Circuit responded to a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) lawsuit
seeking government disclosure of the identities of people within the United
States who were being detained in connection with antiterrorism activities by
accepting the government's "mosaic theory": any bit of information about the
government's antiterrorism activities, no matter how small, might be helpful to
our enemies because they might be able to combine that piece of information
with other bits of information to figure out how to avoid detection.122 This
controversially broad theory can provide the government with a justification for
concealing all of its antiterrorism activities, including those that might be
controversial if the public were aware of them and even patent governmental
misconduct.123 The Supreme Court declined to review the case and has not
118. El-Masri v. United States, 552 U.S. 947 (2007) (mem.).
119. Arar v. Ashcroft, 560 U.S. 978 (2010) (mem.).
120. Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 563 U.S. 1002 (2011) (mem.).
121. See United States v. Awadallah, 349 F.3d 42, 45 (2d Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 543 U.S. 1056 (2005).
The Court later granted certiorari in another case involving pretextual detention of a terrorism suspect under the
material witness statute. See infra note 155 and accompanying text.
122. See Ctr. for Nat'l Sec. Studies v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 928 (D.C. Cir. 2003), cert.
denied, 540 U.S. 1104 (2004).
123. See David E. Pozen, Note, The Mosaic Theory, National Security, and the Freedom of Information
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considered whether the mosaic theory goes too far in defeating calls for greater
transparency.
b. Closed Deportation Hearings
The Third Circuit approved the government's subsequently rescinded
blanket policy of closing deportation hearings in "special interest" cases and
thus barring the public and press from attending.124 The cases covered by this
policy involved deportees suspected of some link to terrorist activities, even if
the evidence was slim or unreliable. The court's opinion slighted the idea that
the First Amendment confers a right on the public and press to attend
deportation proceedings.125 Not having found a substantial constitutional
counterbalance, the court readily accepted the government's contention that
closing all such proceedings was appropriate because open proceedings might
help our enemies to know who was being targeted for deportation-a version of
the "mosaic theory."' 26
The Supreme Court denied certiorari even though this Third Circuit opinion
was in tension with an earlier Sixth Circuit opinion that interpreted the First
Amendment right to open proceedings as encompassing an essential right to
attend deportation hearings.127 The Sixth Circuit's opinion, ruling in favor of
the First Amendment claim, grandly declared, "[d]emocrac[y] die[s] behind
closed doors."l 28 Although the Supreme Court usually favors hearing cases
involving a split between circuits, the Court avoided reviewing the differences
of opinion between these two circuits about the proper application of the
"experience and logic" test of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia.129
c. Secret Docket Entries
Authorities arrested and detained a Florida man named Mohamed Kamel
Bellahouel after discovering that he had been a waiter in a restaurant where
several of the 9/11 hijackers had eaten a few weeks before the attacks.1 30
Act, 115 YALE L.J. 628, 628 (2005) (arguing post-9/11 mosaic theory "susceptible to abuse"). Pozen notes that
the theory "has been applied in ways that are unfalsifiable, in tension with the text and purpose of FOIA, and
susceptible to abuse and overbreadth." Id.
124. See N. Jersey Media Grp., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 308 F.3d 198, 204-05 (3d Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 538
U.S. 1056 (2003).
125. See id.
126. See id. at 217-18.
127. See Detroit Free Press v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 681, 683 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding open deportation
proceeding presumptively required by First Amendment).
128. Id.
129. 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The two opinions were not completely conflicting, as the Sixth Circuit relied on
the facts of the particular case before it in reaching its results. The circuits, however, certainly differed in their
interpretation of First Amendment precedent.
130. See SUSAN N. HERMAN, TAKING LIBERTIES: THE WAR ON TERROR AND THE EROSION OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 199 (2011).
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Bellahouel was released five months later, after testifying before a grand
jury.131 While he was in custody as a material witness, he brought a habeas
corpus petition to challenge the legality of his detention.1 32
After his release, he discovered that all proceedings relating to his habeas
corpus petition were not only sealed but completely invisible.1 33  All court
opinions were filed under seal, his case was not even listed on the court's
docket, and all courtrooms where his case was proceeding were closed to the
public and press.134 Ironically, the Eleventh Circuit's argument in Bellahouel's
First Amendment challenge to this level of hyper-secrecy was held in secret,
and the court then issued a secret opinion.135 The Supreme Court denied
certiorari.136
4. Surveillance
The Supreme Court also avoided early cases challenging the
constitutionality of the government's post-9/11 surveillance powers. These
included the Sixth Circuit's decision vacating-on the ground that none of the
plaintiffs had standing-the 2006 Michigan opinion holding NSA surveillance
unconstitutional. 1 They also included a 2010 ruling in the case of Brandon
Mayfield, an Oregon lawyer mistakenly suspected of involvement in a Madrid
train bombing, which considered the constitutionality of an important post-9/1 1
expansion of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA). The Oregon
district court's conclusion that the provision in question was unconstitutional
conflicted with an earlier decision of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR) upholding this expansion of surveillance powers.139
The Supreme Court had no need to deny certiorari in the earlier case because
the FISCR is an ex parte court where only the government appears if it wishes
to appeal a lower FISA court denial of surveillance authority.140 The
131. See id
132. See id.
133. See id. at 200-01.
134. See HERMAN, supra note 130, at 200.
135. See id.
136. See M.K.B. v. Warden, 540 U.S. 1213 (2004) (mem.).
137. See ACLU v. Nat'l Sec. Agency, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 781 (E.D. Mich. 2006), rev'd, 493 F.3d 648
(6th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 552 U.S. 1179 (2008).
138. See Mayfield v. United States, 599 F.3d 964, 966, 968 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1002
(2010). Although the district court found that Mayfield was a victim of unconstitutional surveillance, his case
was vacated for procedural reasons: the government could not be compelled to disgorge the records relating to
the Mayfield family's surveillance in light of the terms of a settlement Mayfield had reached with the
government for his reckless detention. See generally U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN.,
A REvIEw OF THE FBI's HANDLING OF THE BRANDON MAYFIELD CASE (2006), https://www.oig.justice.gov/
special/s0601/final.pdf[https://perma.cc/7H39-ZX4S] (giving extensive account ofMayfield's saga).
139. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 746 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (holding amended version of FISA
constitutional).
140. See Letter from the Honorable Reggie B. Walton, Presiding Judge, to the Honorable Patrick J. Leahy,
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government won in the appellate court; there was no losing party because there
was no party other than the government. Therefore, there was no one in a
position to ask the Supreme Court to hear the case. The ACLU tried filing a
motion to intervene in the case to be able to seek Supreme Court review, but
the Supreme Court denied the motion to intervene, ending the case.1 41 In the
later Mayfield case, there was an appellant, and so the Court had an actual
certiorari petition to deny.
B. Certiorari Granted
There is another obvious principle of selection at work in the Supreme
Court's docket of cases regarding antiterrorism strategies. The only cases in
which the Court has granted certiorari have been those in which the
government lost in the court below. In most of these cases, the Court reversed
or vacated lower court rulings in favor of the plaintiffs, relying on procedural
bars.
1. Pleading Requirements
In Iqbal v. Hasty,142 the plaintiff, who was arrested and detained at the
Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn (MDC) for an immigration
violation during the fall of 2001, complained that he was subjected to punitive
and abusive treatment because he was a Muslim. 143  A report by the
Department of Justice Inspector General's Office previously concluded that the
kinds of abusive practices alleged in the complaint, including physical and
verbal abuse, had indeed been prevalent at the MDC. 144 The Second Circuit
upheld the district court's decision to deny a motion to dismiss the complaint.
But in Ashcroft v. 1qbal,145 the five-to-four Court found that the complaint
failed to meet federal pleading standards. The dissenters and commentators
charged that the pleading standards had been augmented post hoc to defeat
these claims.1 46
Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate (July 29, 2013), https://www.leahy.senate.gov/ imo/medial
doc/Honorable%20Patrick%20J%2OLeahy.pdf [https://perma.cc/25FA-DKJ4].
141. See ACLU v. United States, 538 U.S. 920 (2003) (mem.).
142. 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007), rev'd sub nom Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
143. See id. at 147-48.
144. See U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER
11 DETAINEES' ALLEGATIONS OF ABUSE AT THE METROPOLITAN DETENTION CENTER IN BROOKLYN, NEW
YORK (2003), https://oig.justice.gov/special/0312/final.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3LU-QETA].
145. 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
146. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stephen C. Yeazell, Inventing Tests, Destabilizing Systems, 95 IOWA L.
REv. 821, 823-24 (2010) (critiquing "gatekeeping regime" initiated by Iqbal); David L. Noll, The
Indeterminacy oflqbal, 99 GEO. L.J. 117, 122 (2010) (addressing new fact-finding role courts will play in
motions to dismiss after Iqbal); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Remarks for Second Circuit Judicial Conference, 2009
SUPREME CT.Gov (June 12, 2009), http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_06-12-09
[https://perma.cc/SW8P-BCRA] (maintaining Court "messed up the Federal Rules" in Iqbal).
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Most recently, the Court granted certiorari to consider a later Second Circuit
decision to allow claims to proceed that arose out of the Fall 2001 detentions. 147
The plaintiffs in Turkmen v. Hastyl48 had been seeking redress in the courts
since 2002.149 After the Supreme Court's 2009 decision in Iqbal, the plaintiffs
amended their complaints' 50 and in 2015, the Second Circuit ruled that some of
their claims should not have been dismissed: they were sufficiently pleaded,151
a cause of action existed under Bivens,152 and the defendants could not claim
qualified immunity as to all claims.' 53 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
review these conclusions even though two Justices, Elena Kagan and Sonia
Sotomayor, recused themselves.1 54 Thus, as of the date certiorari was granted,
October 11, 2016, only six Justices were available to heir the case.
2. Qualified Immunity
A ruling that qualified immunity protected Attorney General Ashcroft
insulated his decision to use the material witness law as a pretext to incarcerate
suspects over whom there was insufficient evidence to charge with an
offense. 155
3. Standing
In the 2008 case, Clapper v. Amnesty International,156 the Supreme Court
chose to hear an appeal from a rare circuit court ruling that would have allowed
a challenge to the legality and constitutionality of surveillance powers.157 The
Court reversed the Second Circuit's conclusion that the plaintiffs had standing,
once again avoiding the merits of the claims.' 58
147. See Ashcroft v. Turkmen, No. 15-1359, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6272 (Oct. 11, 2016) (mem.); Hasty v.
Turkmen, No. 15-1363, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6273 (Oct. 11, 2016) (mem.); Ziglar v. Turkmen, No. 15-1358, 2016
U.S. LEXIS 6271 (Oct. 11, 2016) (mem.).
148. 789 F.3d 218 (2d Cir. 2015).
149. See id. at 224.
150. See id. at 225.
151. See id. at 233.
152. See Turkmen, 789 F.3d at 233-37.
153. See id. at 246-47.
154. See Hasty v. Turkmen, No. 15-1363, 2016 U.S. LEXIS 6273, at 1 (Oct. 11, 2016) (mem.).
155. See Ashcroft v. Al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 743 (2011). Another aspect of the lawsuit against the FBI
agents involved was later settled. See US Settles ACLULawsuit Challenging Post-9/11 Arrests ofMuslim Men,
ACLU (Jan. 16, 2015), https://www.aclu.org/news/us-settles-aclu-lawsuit-challenging-post-91 1-arrests-muslim
-men [https://perma.cc/VKR5-H42G].
156. 133 S. Ct. 1138 (2013).
157. Seeid. at 1143, 1146.
158. Seeid.at1l43.
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4. Procedural Ruling
Finally, in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,159 the Court granted
certiorari to redress a rare government loss on the merits in a circuit court and
actually reviewed the merits of the claim: vagueness and First Amendment
challenges to a USA PATRIOT Act provision criminalizing the provision of
"expert advice or assistance" to terrorists.1 60 The Humanitarian Law Project, a
group of peace activists who worked with insurgent groups to utilize peaceful
dispute resolution rather than violence, was concerned that this elastic category
might expose them to prosecution for their antiterrorism activities.161
The Supreme Court, in a six-to-three ruling, held that the statute was not
vague and could indeed cover even expert assistance of the type the
respondents offered.162 The Court also held that prosecuting Humanitarian
Law Project members for such activities would not violate the First
Amendment's guarantee of free association or free speech.163 The majority
chose deference to executive branch decisions about whom to prosecute over
traditional First Amendment analysis.
1 64
IV. CONCLUSION
The fact that Humanitarian Law Project, the extraordinary case in which the
Court did not take a procedural out, resulted in a decision blowing a hole in the
First Amendment, raises a provocative question. Might it be better to have
courts foul off claim-like a batter staying alive-rather than ruling on the
merits and minimizing constitutional and other rights? If procedural avoidance
is the only alternative to shredding the Constitution, might it seem the more
desirable approach?
Justice Robert Jackson's memorable dissenting opinion in Korematsu v.
United States1 65 suggests that avoidance of controversial issues is sometimes
the Court's better choice. He criticized the Court for endorsing the
government's claim that a purported national security measure is constitutional
where he believed that the justices did not actually have sufficient expertise to
evaluate the government's justifications:
[O]nce a judicial opinion rationalizes such an order to show that it conforms to
the Constitution, or rather rationalizes the Constitution to show that the
Constitution sanctions such an order, the Court for all time has validated the
159. 561 U.S. 1(2010).
160. See id. at 13-14.
161. See id. at 10-11.
162. See id. at 7-8.
163. See Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 25-28.
164. See id at 48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). It was unclear that Congress had actually intended the statute to
be broad enough to cover such activities. See id.
165. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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principle.... The principle then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the
hand of any authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need. 166
But the "war on terror" is very different from World War II, a traditional war
that had a definite physical and temporal duration. Our post-9/11 regime of
detention, surveillance, and targeted killing has been going on for fifteen years
and currently shows no sign of abating. America's reach is no longer limited
by the geography of battlefields or national borders; our surveillance
capabilities have increased exponentially; we cannot expect to negotiate an end
to hostilities with terrorists. Nevertheless, our elected officials seem, for the
most part, to have accepted wartime measures as our new normal.
As Justice O'Connor's observations suggest, the alternative to a judicial
remedy for deplorable conduct like torture and extra-legal killings seems to be
no remedy at all. And if we do not acknowledge past misconduct, how can we
realistically expect that such conduct will not continue or even worsen under
future administrations?
166. Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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